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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I. DEGREE OF DISABILITY MAY BE HIGHER THAN ESTABLISHED
By MEDICAL TESTIMONY
The South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the stan-
dard of judicial review in workers' compensation cases1 in Cropf
v. Pantry, Inc.2 The court of appeals found that substantial evi-
dence in the record supported the Industrial Commission's
award; therefore, the trial court violated section 1-23-380(g) of
the Administrative Procedures Act' by substituting its judgment
regarding the extent of the claimant's disability for that of the
Commission. Cropf not only reaffirmed the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's interpretation of section 1-23-380(g) in Lark v.
Bi-Lo, Inc.4 , but more significantly, the court rejected the notion
that the degree of disability can be no greater than the highest
degree established by expert medical testimony.'
In Cropf the claimant slipped and fell while on the job and
injured her back. The Hearing Commissioner found that she suf-
fered a five percent permanent partial disability of her back.'
1. For a collection of cases addressing this issue, see Hunter v. Patrick Constr. Co.,
289 S.C. 46, 344 S.E.2d 613 (1986); Linen v. Ruscon Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 67, 332 S.E.2d
211 (1985); Holcombe v. Dan River Mills, 286 S.C. 223, 333 S.E.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1985);
Webber v. Michelin Tire Corp., 285 S.C. 581, 330 S.E.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1985); Poulos v.
Pete's Drive-In No. 3, 284 S.C. 264, 325 S.E.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1985); Lowe v. Am-Can
Transp. Servs., 283 S.C. 534, 324 S.E.2d 87 (Ct. App. 1984); Bilton v. Best Western Royal
Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 321 S.E.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. 289 S.C. 106, 344 S.E.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1986).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (Law. Co-op. 1986) provides in part that "[t]he
court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings ... are ... (5) Clearly erroneous in view
of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record."
4. 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Lark established the substantial evidence
rule as the appropriate standard of judicial review. For a survey of the Lark decision, see
Administrative Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REv. 11-14 (1982);
see also Administrative Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 38 S.C.L. REv. 1
(1986).
5. 289 S.C. at 108, 344 S.E.2d at 881.
6. The Hearing Commissioner's primary function is to gather evidence and to de-
termine the dispute in a summary manner. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-40 (Law. Co-op.
1985). See generally Green v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 250 S.C. 58, 156 S.E.2d 318
(1967); 289 S.C. at 47 n. 1, 344 S.E.2d at 614 n. 1.
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The Industrial Commission, pursuant to section 42-17-50 of the
Code, 7 increased the award because it found that the claimant
had incurred thirty percent disability.8 On appeal by the em-
ployer, the trial court modified the award to fifteen percent and
stated that there was no reasonable basis for the Commission's
increase. Cropf appealed and the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reversed and reinstated the Commission's award.
A key issue in Cropf concerned the weight to be given ex-
pert testimony offered by two chiropractors and two orthopedic
surgeons. The testimony conflicted on the extent of the claim-
ant's back injury. Neither of the two orthopedic surgeons found
any permanent disability, and in fact, both diagnosed the claim-
ant's condition as a mild strain. One of the chiropractors deter-
mined that there was a ten to fifteen percent impairment of the
back, and the other acknowledged some permanent disability,
but did not express an opinion about a particular percentage of
disability. From the record, it appears that the trial court based
its fifteen percent permanent disability award on the highest im-
pairment rating given by the medical experts, and the court of
appeals took issue on this analysis.
The court of appeals was concerned that the trial court had
disregarded established workers' compensation principles by im-
plicitly holding that the claimant's degree of disability was lim-
ited to the highest degree established by medical testimony. 9
The court appeared to caution that when determining whether
the evidence in the record supports the Commission's award, the
reviewing court must carefully examine the entire record and
must not intrude upon the province of the fact finder by revers-
ing findings supported by substantial evidence. The court rea-
soned that although the degree of disability chosen by the Com-
mission was not supported by medical testimony, the claimant's
own testimony concerning her limitations and her medical his-
tory was credible and substantial, and along with the expert tes-
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-17-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985); see also Cauble v. Macke Co., 78
N.C. App. 793, 338 S.E.2d 320 (1986) (Commission may adopt, modify, or reject the
findings of fact of the Hearing Commissioner). See generally 283 S.C. at 536-38, 324
S.E.2d at 89 (Commission may make its own findings of fact and reach its own conclu-
sions of law either consistent or inconsistent with those of the Hearing Commissioner).
8. Record at 60-61. Commissioner Macmillan, however, opined that the disability
should be increased to 15%.
9. 289 S.C. 108, 344 S.E.2d at 880-81.
232 [Vol. 39
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timony, supported the Commission's award."°
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that when
there is a conflict in the testimony of different witnesses, find-
ings of fact by the Commission are conclusive." Accordingly,
when, as in Cropf, medical testimony regarding the extent of
disability is in conflict, the possibility of drawing two inconsis-
tent inferences or findings does not prevent the Commission's
finding from being supported by substantial evidence. 2 This
view, which conforms with the view of the majority of jurisdic-
tions,' 3 places the Commission in a position similar to that of a
jury. Analogous to a jury's findings of fact on disputed issues,
the Commission's findings will not be overturned "unless there
is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by
a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based."' 4 The
existence of evidence in the record that contradicts the Commis-
sion's finding is of no consequence if substantial evidence in the
record supports the finding. The supreme court in Lark cau-
tioned that a court may not substitute its judgment for an
agency's judgment regarding the weight of the evidence on ques-
tions of fact.'5 In reversing the trial court in Cropf, the court of
appeals established that reversals of Commission decisions will
be scrutinized carefully.
The court in Cropf indicated that medical testimony does
not necessarily limit the amount of the Commission's award and
that the finding of disability may be greater than the highest
degree supported by medical testimony. Professor Larson ob-
serves that the difference between jurisdictions which hold that
a commission must never find a degree of disability greater than
10. 289 S.C. at 107, 344 S.E.2d at 880.
11. Wynn v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 238 S.C. 1, 118 S.E.2d 812 (1961); see also
Holcombe v. Dan River Mills, 286 S.C. 223, 225, 333 S.E.2d 338, 340 (Ct. App. 1985).
12. Webber v. Michelin Tire Corp., 285 S.C. 581, 584, 330 S.E.2d 547, 548 (Ct. App.
1985) (citing Ellis v. Spartan Mills, 276 S.C. 216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981)); see Hunter v.
Patrick Constr. Co., 289 S.C. 46, 47, 344 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1986); Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276
S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981).
13. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.21 (1983); see also
Ballenger v. ITT Grinnell Indus. Piping, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 392, 342 S.E.2d 582 (1986),
afl'd in part, remanded in part, 348 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. App. 1986).
14. 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 307 (citing Independent Stave Co. v. Fulton, 251
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that established by medical testimony's and those which hold
that a commission's award of disability is not limited by the de-
gree established by medical testimony" is the manner in which
they define disability.' In the former view the disability recog-
nized is anatomical, whereas in the latter the disability may also
include components of training, education, age, intelligence, and
economic opportunity.19 The better view appears to be the lat-
ter, which was advocated by the court in Cropf, because it allows
the Commission to take into account not only medical evalua-
tions, but also many other factors relevant when determining
the disability award. The Commission's award, however, may
not rest on surmise, conjecture, or speculation.20 Absent a clear
abuse of discretion or error of law, the award will be upheld on
appeal.
The court of appeals' decision in Cropf reaffirms the sub-
stantial evidence rule of judicial review in workers' compensa-
tion cases. The court also suggested that it will continue to con-
strue liberally the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of the
claimant-employee when the evidence in the record is contradic-
tory.21 The significance of the decision, however, lies in the
court's response to the argument that the thirty percent award
was not supported by substantial evidence because the highest
impairment rating given by any of the medical experts was fif-
teen percent. Neither the Commission nor the court is compelled
to accept blindly the medical expert's opinion concerning disa-
bility. Blind acceptance of medical testimony, in the words of
one court, "would impermissibly shift the legal determination of
'disability' to physicians [and] would be in clear contravention
16. Judicial Admin. Comm'n v. Marks, 394 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(award for 25% disability could not be upheld when the highest evaluation given by a
physician was 20%); Yuba Heat Transfer v. Wiggins, 630 P.2d 783 (Okla. 1980) (state
supreme court held that award must be within limits expressed by medical experts in
evaluating the extent of disability), cited in 3 A. LARSON, supra note 13, § 79.52(d), at
15-426.142 n.39.1.
17. Carroll Constr. Co. v. Hutcheson, 347 So. 2d 527 (Ala. Ct. App. 1977) (court
awarded benefits for total permanent disability although medical testimony established
only 5% disability), cited in 3 A. LARSON, supra note 13, § 79.52(d), at 15-426.142. n.39.2;
Gly Constr. Co. v. Davis, 60 Md. App. 602, 483 A.2d 1330 (1984).
18, 3 A. LARSON, supra note 13, § 79.52(d).
19. Id. § 79.52(d), at 15-426.142 to -426.143.
20. See McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C. 466, 313 S.E. 2d 466 (Ct.
App. 1984).
21. Douglas v. Spartan Mills, 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1967).
[Vol. 39234
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of the legislative intent and traditional role of the Commission
or court."22
Harry J. Stathopoulos
II. STATUS OF TRAVELING EMPLOYEES RULE UNCLEAR
In Brownlee v. Wetterau Food Services23 the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of workers' compensa-
tion benefits to the dependents of an employee who died from
injuries received in an automobile accident in St. Louis, Mis-
souri. The court of appeals agreed with the conclusion of the
single Industrial Commissioner that the claimants failed to es-
tablish that Kenneth Brownlee had been using the company au-
tomobile at a time and place where his duty as an employee re-
quired him to be.24 More importantly, however, the court of
appeals' reasoning leaves some doubt about the continued exis-
tence of the "traveling employees rule" in South Carolina.25
Wetterau sent Brownlee, who worked in Wetterau's North
Charleston, South Carolina office, to St. Louis, Missouri to at-
tend an employer-sponsored training seminar.2" Activities relat-
ing to the week-long seminar began each day at approximately
7:00 a.m. and ended at 10:00 p.m. At 1:55 a.m. on the last day of
the seminar,27 Brownlee and three other Wetterau employees
died in an automobile accident.28 Brownlee was a passenger in
the company-owned automobile.
In denying benefits, the court of appeals noted that the rec-
ord contained no evidence that Brownlee died while attending
22. Gly Constr. Co. v. Davis, 60 Md. App. 602, 607, 483 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984).
23. 288 S.C. 82, 339 S.E.2d 694 (Ct. App. 1986).
24. Record at 9. The court rejected the claimants' attempt to extend compensation
for traveling employees beyond the factual situation in which a traveling employee is
killed while on the way back to the motel from a restaurant. See Merritt v. Smith, 269
S.C. 301, 237 S.E.2d 366 (1977).
25. See 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 25.00 (1985). Em-
ployees whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises are held in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment continuously during
the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries
arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home
are usually held compensable.
26. The seminar occurred during the week of September 25-29, 1978. Record at 4.
27. 288 S.C. at 84, 339 S.E.2d at 695.
28. Record at 3.
1987] 235
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either a job-related function or an employer-sponsored event.
Rather, the court of appeals concluded, there was "substantial
evidence that Brownlee died while engaged in an outing that oc-
curred after work, away from the premises of the employer, and
at a time when his employer exercised no control over his activi-
ties. ' 29 The fact that Brownlee died in a company automobile
did not render the conclusion of the Industrial Commission
clearly erroneous; in the past, Wetterau had permitted employ-
ees to use company cars for personal business if the employees
paid for gasoline and oil.30
In denying recovery, the court of appeals relied on Grice v.
National Cash Register Co.31 The court's reliance on Grice, how-
ever, was misplaced for two, related reasons: (1) Grice was de-
cided before South Carolina recognized a traveling employees
rule; and (2) continued use of Grice in cases involving traveling
employees relegates Merritt v. Smith, 2 a case decided after
Grice, to an exception to the general law concerning workers'
compensation coverage for recreational and social activities.
The court's language in Grice demonstrates that it was de-
cided before South Carolina recognized a traveling employees
rule.3 3 The Grice court stated that Grice's accident was indistin-
29. 288 S.C. at 85, 339 S.E.2d at 695. Particularly damaging to the claimants was the
testimony of Tom Jameson, who was assigned to the same motel room as Brownlee.
Jameson's deposition included a statement by Brownlee that "he [Brownlee] and Jerry
Aue, Martha Courtney and Dixie Mazurie were all going to a movie." Record at 134.
Jameson was invited to go along but declined. Claimants objected to this testimony on
the basis of the Dead Man's Statute. Record at 6-7.
30. 288 S.C. at 85, 339 S.E.2d at 696.
31. 250 S.C. 1, 156 S.E.2d 321 (1977). In Grice the claimants were denied death
benefits. The court held that the deceased was not acting within the scope of his employ-
ment when he died in an automobile accident in Dayton, Ohio, while returning from a
picnic. The employee, however, was only in Dayton because his employer sent him there.
The picnic was planned by the deceased and other employees and was held after working
hours and off the premises of the employer.
32. 269 S.C. 301, 237 S.E.2d 366 (1977). In Merritt the executrix of the decedent's
estate brought an action against the co-employee driver of the employer's car for wrong-
ful death. The court held that since both employees were returning to their motel after
having gone to eat at a nearby restaurant with their direct supervisor in a company car,
both the deceased and the respondent were acting within the course and scope of their
employment. Therefore, the respondent was immune from suit by reason of the co-em-
ployee immunity provision of S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
33. The claimants in Grice unsuccessfully urged that
[w]here an employee is sent to a distant place by his employer to perform
duties in connection with his employment and sustains an injury after working
hours, while engaged in reasonable activities in seeking to satisfy his physical
6
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guishable from the hypothetical case in which an employee was
killed while returning home from a picnic in the city where he
was regularly employed.3 4 If Grice had been decided in a juris-
diction that recognized the traveling employees rule, the issue
would have been analyzed differently. 35
Not until Merritt v. Smith3 6 did the South Carolina Su-
preme Court recognize the traveling employees rule as stated by
Professor Larson.3 7 While the Merritt court did not expressly
overrule Grice,38 a thorough reading of the two cases in light of
the traveling employees rule shows that Merritt is not an excep-
tion to Grice, but rather is based on a separate workers' compen-
sation doctrine. Under the traveling employees rule, traveling
employees are presumed to be "within the course of their em-
ployment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct
department [sic] on a personal errand is shown.
'39
This shift in the normal presumption concerning whether
an employee is within the scope of his or her employment can be
outcome determinative, especially in cases like Brownlee in
which all the occupants of the automobile are killed. Since the
Grice rule treats traveling employees the same as local employ-
ees and removes the presumption of coverage for traveling em-
ployees, it is in conflict with the rationale of Merritt and the
traveling employees rule. Because Brownlee involved the death
of a traveling employee, the court of appeals should have ap-
needs, including relaxation and recreation, or while returning to his quarters
after having engaged in reasonable activities, he is entitled to the protection of
the act.
250 S.C. at 5, 156 S.E.2d at 323.
34. Id. at 6, 156 S.E.2d at 323-24.
35. Even if the court in Grice had applied the traveling employees rule, a different
result would not necessarily follow. If Grice's death were found to have been caused by a
"distinct department [sic] on a personal errand," the death would still have been non-
compensable. See supra note 25.
36. 269 S.C. 301, 237 S.E.2d 366 (1977).
37. Id. at 307, 237 S.E.2d at 369; see A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 25.00, at 5-252.
Although the court did not state that Merritt was the first use of the traveling employees
rule in South Carolina, Merritt is the only case cited by Professor Larson as applying the
traveling employees rule in South Carolina. See id. § 25.21, at 5-261 n.7.
38. The Merritt court did not even cite Grice in its opinion. The appellant, however,
cited and distinguished the case. Brief of Appellant at 32-34.
39. A. LARSON, supra note 25; see Hobgood v. Anchor Motor Freight, 68 N.C. App.
783, 316 S.E.2d 86 (1984) (employee whose work entails activity away from the em-
ployer's premises acts within the course of his employment continuously during the trip
unless there is proof of distinct or total departure on a personal errand).
7
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plied the traveling employees rule as developed in Merritt.
The second problem with the Brownlee decision is that the
court, in using Merritt as an exception to the general rule of
Grice, confused two separate doctrines of workers' compensation
law. In Grice the court rejected the appellants' theory of relief,
which was based on a form of the traveling employees rule, say-
ing that "general benefits to the employer from social and recre-
ational activities of its employees are not sufficient alone to es-
tablish coverage under the Act."'40 In Merritt the court
recognized that "it is generally observed that accidents arising
while an employee is eating or traveling to and from an eating
establishment while out-of-town are acts within the course and
scope of employment.""' Applying appropriate doctrinal labels,
Grice was decided under the recreational and social activities
rule' 2 and Merritt was decided under the traveling employees
rule.43 In Brownlee the court of appeals viewed Merritt as a nar-
row exception to Grice." If this were the law of South Carolina,
it would deny traveling employees the benefit of the traveling
employees rule and place South Carolina in a minority of states
that do not recognize the traveling employees rule."5
In denying workers' compensation benefits, the Industrial
Commission and the court of appeals analyzed the Brownlee
case as though the rationale of Grice could be applied to both
local and traveling employees. Therefore, since any future reli-
ance on Grice in cases involving traveling employees will only
further push South Carolina into the minority of states that do
not recognize the traveling employees rule, both Grice v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co. and Brownlee v. Wetterau Food Ser-
vices should be overruled. The failure of future courts to clarify
40. 250 S.C. at 5, 156 S.E.2d at 323; see also A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 22.00 at 5-
82 ("Recreation or social activities are within the course of employment when ... (3)
the employer derives substantial benefit from the activity beyond the intangible value of
improvement in employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation
and social life.").
41. 269 S.C. at 237, 237 S.E.2d at 369; see also A. LARSON, supra note 25.
42. See A. LARSON, supra note 25, § 22.00, at 5-82.
43. Id. § 25.00.
44. The court stated the general rule from Grice and then stated that since
Brownlee did not die while on his way back to the motel from a restaurant, Merritt did
not apply. 288 S.C. at 85, 339 S.E.2d at 695-96.
45. See A. LARSON, supra note 25, at 5-252 (traveling employees rule is recognized in
a majority of jurisdictions).
[Vol. 39
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the distinctions between the recreational and social activities
rule and the traveling employees rule will only further cloud
South Carolina workers' compensation law.
David A. Raeker
III. RECOVERY LIMITATION HELD INAPPLICABLE
In Corbett v. City of Columbia46 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that section 42-9-100 of the South Carolina
Code,47 which provided for a maximum recovery of $40,000 in all
workers' compensation cases, 48 did not apply to a claimant who
initially had been injured while the statute was in effect, but
who did not become permanently and totally disabled until after
section 42-9-100 was repealed.49 While Corbett does not re-
present a novel approach to this particular factual situation,5 0
consideration of the decision in light of two earlier supreme
court cases 51 presents a definite framework for analyzing cases
involving section 42-9-100.
Corbett, a firefighter for the City of Columbia, suffered
smoke inhalation in 1977.52 Although the incident left him tem-
porarily and totally disabled for several months, Corbett was
able to return to "light" work at full salary for approximately
fifteen months.5 3 On January 1, 1979, however, Corbett was de-
clared permanently and totally disabled. Consequently, he re-
tired from the Fire Department for medical reasons.
5 4
At the time of the 1977 accident, section 42-9-100 provided
for a maximum recovery of $40,000 in all workers' compensation
46. 290 S.C. 71, 348 S.E.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. granted, No. 0780, Davis Adv.
Sh. No. 10 (S.C. Mar. 21, 1987).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976), repealed 1978).
48. Section 42-9-100 read, "The total compensation payable under this Title shall in
no case exceed forty thousand dollars."
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976), repealed 1978).
50. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied heavily on the North Caro-
lina case Smith v. American & Efird Mills, 51 N.C. App. 480, 277 S.E.2d 83 (1981), af'd,
305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634 (1982), which contains the same basic factual situation as
Corbett.
51. The two prior cases are Sellers v. Daniel Constr. Co., 285 S.C. 484, 330 S.E.2d
305 (1985) and Mizell v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 281 S.C. 430, 315 S.E.2d 123 (1984).
52. 290 S.C. at 72, 348 S.E.2d at 192.
53. Id. at 72-73, 348 S.E.2d at 192-93.
54. Id., 348 S.E.2d at 192.
1987]
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cases. 5 Subsequently, on May 19, 1978, the statute was re-
pealed.56 On March 1, 1980, Corbett filed a workers' compensa-
tion claim under the provisions of the amended statute.57 The
Hearing Commissioner found that Corbett's permanent and to-
tal disability was a continuation of his 1977 chest and lung con-
dition, and, therefore, his recovery was limited by section 42-9-
100. Both the Industrial Commission and the circuit court
agreed with the Hearing Commissioner's findings.5 8 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that Corbett was en-
titled to a recovery not limited by section 42-9-100.59
Relying on a well-defined line of South Carolina law, the
court of appeals distinguished "physical injury" from "disabil-
ity. ' 160 In South Carolina, workers' compensation benefits are
awarded for disability, as measured by the "incapacity because
of the injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving
at the time of the injury."6' 1 The court of appeals reasoned,
therefore, that Corbett did not have a valid claim and that the
City of Columbia did not become liable for Corbett's permanent
and total disability until after section 42-9-100 had been re-
pealed.6 2 Because Corbett suffered no permanent and total im-
pairment of his capacity to earn wages until January 1, 1979, the
court of appeals concluded that the right to recover for perma-
nent and total disability did not vest in Corbett until January 1,
1979. Therefore, the statute in effect on January 1, 1979 gov-
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-100 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1978).
56. Section 42-9-100 was repealed by Act effective May 19, 1978, 1978 S.C. Acts 500
§ 1.
57. S.C. CODE ANN § 42-9-10 (Law. Co-op 1985) (amended by Act effective May 19,
1978, 1978 S.C. Acts 500 § 1); 290 S.C. at 73, 348 S.E.2d at 192.
58. Id. at 72, 348 S.E.2d at 192.
59. Id. at 75, 348 S.E.2d at 194.
60. For the statutory definition of "injury," see S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (Law. Co-
op. 1976). For the statutory definition of "disability," see S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-120
(Law. Co-op. 1976). For a sampling of cases which distinguish "injury" from "disability,"
see Outlaw v. Johnson Serv. Co., 254 S.C. 486, 176 S.E.2d 152 (1970); Owens v. Herndon,
252 S.C. 166, 165 S.E.2d 696 (1969); and Keeter v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 225 S.C. 389, 82
S.E.2d 520 (1954).
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (definition of "disability").
62. 290 S.C. at 73-75, 348 S.E.2d at 193-94. The court of appeals interpreted Outlaw
v. Johnson Serv. Co., 254 S.C. 486, 176 S.E.2d 152 (1970) to bar a finding of disability
where the injured employee receives post-injury wages equal to pre-injury wages on the
same job. 290 S.C. at 73-74, 348 S.E.2d at 193.
[Vol. 39
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Including the court of appeals decision in Corbett, three
South Carolina appellate cases have involved the repeal of sec-
tion 42-9-100. Prior to Corbett, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Sellers v. Daniel Construction Co. 4 and Mizell v. Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc.6 5 addressed the legal determination of
when a claimant has a vested right to receive workers' compen-
sation benefits.
In Sellers the single commissioner found that an employee
was injured and rendered permanently and totally disabled on
April 4, 1978.6 These findings were not appealed. 7 Later, when
the employee died from a cause completely unrelated to his
compensated injury, his widow requested and received a lump
sum payment of the remaining benefits payable to the de-
ceased." In awarding Mrs. Sellers the lump sum award, the In-
dustrial Commission affirmed the single commissioner's order
that Mrs. Sellers could receive no more than $40,000 because
section 42-9-100 applied. 9
The supreme court agreed with the Industrial Commission
and held that Mrs. Sellers' award was subject to section 42-9-
100, even though the single commissioner's finding that Mr. Sell-
ers was disabled on April 4, 1978 occurred after section 42-9-100
was repealed. The court quoted with approval from the Illinois
case Grigsby v. Industrial Commission:70 "The law in effect at
the time of the injury [which, in Sellers, was also when the disa-
bility arose] governs the rights of the parties and not the law
effective at the time the award is made . . . . , Because Mrs.
Sellers' right to receive the lump sum payment arose from her
husband's disability,7 2 her rights under the workers' compensa-
63. 290 S.C. at 75, 348 S.E.2d at 194.
64. 285 S.C. 484, 330 S.E.2d 305 (1985).
65. 281 S.C. 430, 315 S.E.2d 123 (1984).
66. Record at 7.
67. 285 S.C. at 485, 330 S.E.2d at 306.
68. Record at 13.
69. Id.
70. 76 Ill. 2d 528, 531, 394 N.E.2d 1173, 1174 (1979) (quoting Stanswsky v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 344 Ill. 436, 440, 176 N.E. 898, 899 (1931)).
71. 285 S.C. at 486, 330 S.E.2d at 306.
72. Mr. Sellers died from a cancer that was completely unrelated to his compensable
injury. 285 S.C. at 485, 330 S.E.2d at 306. Additionally, the record reveals no evidence
that the cancer was related to Mr. Sellers' employment.
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tion statutes vested at the time her husband's rights vested.
Mizell v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,75 the third case, also
dealt with the effect of the repeal of section 42-9-100 on the
award a deceased's widow was entitled to receive. In Mizell an
employee, who had been exposed to asbestos fibers in his work
environment, retired in July 1977 when doctors discovered that
he had lung cancer.74 In February 1979 Mr. Mizell died of
bronchogenic carcinoma. In May 1979 Mrs. Mizell filed a work-
ers' compensation claim for death benefits.75 The question at is-
sue was whether Mrs. Mizell's right to death benefits was subject
to the $40,000 limit of section 42-9-100. The supreme court ruled
that Mrs. Mizell was entitled to death benefits of $86,000.76 Re-
lying on both South Carolina law77 and the general rule in the
United States,7 8 the court concluded that because "the depen-
dents' rights are truly separate and distinct from the injured
employee's rights, the date of death of the employee logically
governs which statute is to be applied.
7 9
In Corbett, Sellers, and Mizell the South Carolina appellate
courts established a framework for determining how the repeal
of section 42-9-100 will affect an individual claimant. In apply-
ing the framework, practitioners must determine the precise
statutory basis for the claim in order to decide when a right to
workers' compensation benefits vests in the claimant.
Although section 42-9-100 was repealed in 1979, it is un-
likely that Corbett will be the last case to address the effect of
the repeal of the statute. By examining Corbett, Sellers, and
Mizell, as well as any relevant North Carolina cases,80 the prac-
73. 281 S.C. 430, 315 S.E.2d 123 (1984).
74. See Record at 19 (deposition of Mr. Mizell); Record at 86 (deposition of diagnos-
ing physician).
75. 281 S.C. at 431, 315 S.E.2d at 123. On May 31, 1978, Mr. Mizell filed a claim for
total disability benefits for the period beginning in July 1977. The claim was disputed by
Mr. Mizell's employer, however, and was abandoned upon Mr. Mizell's death before any
hearing was held. Record at 1.
76. 281 S.C. at 431, 315 S.E.2d at 123.
77. Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Co., 236 S.C. 13, 112 S.E.2d 711 (1960) (in occu-
pational disease cases, compensability accrues when death or disability occurs).
78. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 64.00 (1983). Profes-
sor Larson states the general rule as follows: "The dependent's right to death benefits is
an independent right derived from statute, not from the rights of the decedent."
79. 281 S.C. at 433, 315 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting Sizemore v. State Workmen's Com-
pensation Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 100, 106, 219 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1975)).
80. Because South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act was fashioned upon the
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titioner can interpret his factual situation under the analysis
that the South Carolina appellate courts have used in deciding
workers' compensation cases involving the repeal of section 42-9-
100.
David A. Raeker
North Carolina Act, South Carolina courts give weight to decisions by the high court of
North Carolina. See Carter v. Penny Tire & Recapping Co., 261 S.C. 341, 200 S.E.2d 64
(1973). The Corbett court relied heavily on a North Carolina case. See supra note 50.
The Mizell court found the North Carolina case Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297
N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979), very useful.
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